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For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile
Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences
Thirteen-year-old Robert Francis Hanley kicked a hole in
his grandmother's door after she refused to let him enter her
house.' As a result, a juvenile court sentenced Hanley to
twelve months of probation.2 Five years later, following a
wholly unrelated conviction, a federal court seized on the kick-
ing incident and the corresponding probation to subject the
eighteen-year-old Hanley to additional time in prison.3 The in-
crease in Hanley's sentence was required under United States
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) section 4A1.2(d), which
compels courts to enhance adult sentences if the adult has prior
juvenile convictions. 4
When courts apply section 4A1.2(d) to enhance adult
sentences, they highlight a conflict between the juvenile justice
system and the adult criminal system. In criminal proceedings,
the United States Supreme Court has held that adults must re-
ceive full due process protections.5 In comparable juvenile pro-
ceedings, however, the Court has held that juveniles must
1. United States v. Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 357 (1990).
2. Id at 1120.
3. Id at 1118-20.
4. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1989) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] § 4A1.2(d) governs the use
of "offenses committed prior to age eighteen" in sentence enhancement. Id.§ 4A1.2 application note 7. The exact text of the section is as follows:
(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen(1) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sen-
tence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month,
add 3 points under § 4A1.1(a) for each such sentence.
(2) In any other case,
(A) add 2 points under § 4A1.1(b) for each adult or juvenile
sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the de-
fendant was released from such confinement within five
years of his commencement of the instant offense;
(B) add 1 point under § 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile
sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A).
I& § 4A1.2(d).
5. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (setting forth the constitu-
tional protections afforded adult criminal defendants).
1769
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
receive only minimal due process protections.6 To justify the
difference in the due process provided, the Court relies on the
different goals of the two systems.7 Although the criminal sys-
tem strives to punish adults, the juvenile system focuses on
treating juveniles.8
Section 4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines links the two systems.
Specifically, application of section 4A1.2(d) raises the issue of
whether a court may use a defendant's prior juvenile adjudica-
tions in which the defendant was denied the right to a jury trial
to enhance the defendant's sentence for a subsequent adult con-
viction. The ultimate resolution of this issue will affect both
the rights of juveniles in delinquency proceedings and the
length of punishment that courts give adult offenders.
When the Guidelines seek to convert a treatment process
into a punitive process, the Guideline's policy and goals come
into direct conflict with those of the juvenile system. When
courts apply section 4A1.2(d) to enhance an adult sentence,
they seize on a juvenile sentence imposed for treatment pur-
poses, without a jury trial, and fundamentally alter the nature
of that sentence by using it in the adult criminal system solely
to punish recidivism.9 This transmutation unfairly and uncon-
stitutionally ignores the different protections afforded the juve-
nile and the different policies that underpin the juvenile justice
system.10
This Note highlights the constitutional problems caused
when courts use prior juvenile sentences to enhance adult
sentences. Part I examines the sentence enhancement rules
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines; it then outlines
adult sentencing protections and the evolution of juvenile due
process rights, particularly focusing on a juvenile's right to a
jury trial. Part I concludes with a review of section 4A1.2(d),
which requires enhancement of adult sentences if the adult has
a prior juvenile record. Part II argues that section 4A1.2(d), by
requiring courts to use prior juvenile adjudications imposed
6. See infra notes 42-66; see also Feld, The Transformation of the Juve-
nile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 692 (1991) ("[Ihe justice routinely afforded
juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for adults.").
7. See infra notes 43-46, 78 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43, 48 and accompanying text.
9. In formulating the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission was to in-
sure that they "reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term
of imprisonment for purposes of rehabilitating the defendant." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(k) (1988).
10. This Note will use the term "juvenile justice system" to refer to the
laws, statutes, rules, procedures, and court systems that deal with juveniles.
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without the protection of a jury trial to enhance an adult sen-
tence, is unconstitutional. In addition, Part II argues that sec-
tion 4A1.2(d) is inconsistent with congressional intent and
explains how providing juveniles with the right to jury trials
mitigates this inconsistency. This Note concludes that courts
should use prior juvenile adjudications to enhance adult
sentences only if the juveniles in those adjudications were af-
forded the same constitutional rights and protections as simi-
larly situated adults.
I. JUVENILE RIGHTS AND ADULT SENTENCES
A. SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT UNDER THE GUIDELINES
Since November 1987, when a federal court convicts a de-
fendant, the sentencing judge must impose a sentence based on
the United States Sentencing Guidelines" formulated by the
United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commis-
sion). The Guidelines attempt to achieve three goals: punish-
ment, general deterrence, and incapacitation. 12 Congress
ordered the creation of the Guidelines to prevent the abuses
and biases that occurred under the previous system of discre-
tionary sentencing.13 To eliminate these problems, the Guide-
lines provide mandatory uniform sentencing throughout the
United States.' 4 Indeed, Congress intended the Guidelines to
ensure that courts treat similarly situated defendants simi-
larly.'5 Consequently, Congress prohibited the Guidelines from
11. U.S.S.G. § 1A2. In 1984, Congress established the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 991
(1988). The Guidelines became effective as of November 1987. Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (1988). The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Guidelines in United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
12. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990). The purposes of the sentencing guidelines are
outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
13. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3235. Congress specifically required that the
Guidelines treat the "race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic sta-
tus" of the offender as "entirely neutral." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988).
15. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3234. The Congress believed that the imposition
of the Guidelines would for the first time assure a consistency in federal sen-
tencing philosophy. Id at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADlIN.
NEWS at 3242. Deviation from the Guidelines is generally prohibited. The
Guidelines state:
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considering discretionary factors, 16 such as race, sex, or socio-
economic status.17
The Guidelines seek not only to make the punishment fit
the crime,' but also to make the punishment fit the offender.19
Consequently, the Sentencing Commission designed the Guide-
lines to maintain uniformity in sentencing by requiring sen-
tencing courts first to classify convicted defendants based on
their present offense and prior criminal record. Courts must
then apply that classification to a preordained sentencing grid.20
As a result, courts applying the Guidelines punish a defendant
with a prior criminal record more severely than a first
offender.21
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sen-
tence different from that described. In determining whether a cir-
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall
consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also Breyer, supra note 11, at 4-5 (listing pur-
poses of the guidelines).
16. The Guidelines do allow for an increase or decrease in a defendant's
criminal history score where "reliable information indicates that the criminal
history [score] does not adequately reflect" the defendant's criminal history or
likelihood of recidivism. "[A] prior arrest record itself," however, may not be
considered under this provision. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Any departure from the
Guidelines is grounds for appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988). The age of the defendant may be considered
in sentencing only to the extent relevant. Id
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988).
19. The law requires judges to consider the history and characteristics of
the offender when issuing a sentence. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3235.
20. The Guidelines classify the present offense committed into 43 differ-
ent categories of severity. After a defendant's present offense has been classi-
fied, the sentencing judge looks across a table to determine the proper range
of sentence based on the defendant's criminal history category. There are six
criminal history categories. The categories are as follows: Category I (zero or
one criminal history points), Category H (two or three points), Category DI
(four to six points), Category IV (seven to nine points), Category V (ten to
twelve points), and Category VI (thirteen or more points). For example, a de-
fendant who is guilty of committing a level six offense and who has a Category
I criminal history score should receive a sentence of zero to six months of im-
prisonment. Another defendant who commits the same offense, but with a
Category VI criminal history score, will receive twelve to eighteen months in
prison. U.S.S.G. § 5A.
21. The Guidelines, in the introductory comments on criminal history,
state that:
General deterence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be
1772
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A defendant's total criminal history score determines the
extent to which the court enhances the defendant's sentence.22
Each prior sentence increases a defendant's criminal history
score by one or more points.23 Points are based not on the se-
verity or nature of the prior offense, however, but on the
length of the sentence imposed for that offense.24 By enhanc-
ing sentences in this manner, the Sentencing Commission
sought to punish recidivism and to protect the public from fu-
ture criminal behavior.2
The criminal history score includes consideration of
juvenile dispositions.2 6 Despite acknowledging the possibility
for "large disparities" based on the differences in the availabil-
ity of juvenile records, 27 section 4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines re-
quires courts to add points for each juvenile offense to the
criminal history score.28 Unlike some state guidelines sys-
sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the
need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public
from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of re-
cidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated
criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful
rehabilitation.
U.S.S.G. § 4A introductory commentary;, see United States v. Scroggins, 880
F.2d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990).
22. A criminal history score is computed by adding together the total
number of points a defendant has compiled from prior offenses. U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1. The greater a defendant's criminal history score, the more severe his
sentence. See id,
23. Id. All felony offenses are counted along with most misdemeanor and
petty offense. Some minor offenses are not counted under certain circum-
stances. Id. § 4A1.2(c).
24. See id. § 4A1.1. Three points are added for each prior sentence ex-
ceeding one year and a month in length regardless of whether the prior of-
fense was for forgery, drug dealing, or murder. I&
25. "A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpa-
ble than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment." Id. § 4A
introductory commentary.
In adopting the Guidelines, Congress abandoned the rehabilitative model
of criminal sentencing as outmoded. Congress believed it "now quite certain
that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated." S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3221; see also United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204,
1207-08 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990).
26. See supra note 4.
27. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 7.
28. Id § 4A1.2(d); see id. §§ 4A1.1(a), 4A1.1(b), 4Al.1(c). The Guidelines
provide that "[t]o avoid disparities from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the age
at which a defendant is considered a 'juvenile,' [§ 4A1.2(d)] applies to all of-
fenses committed prior to age eighteen." Id. § 4A1.2 application note 7. A ju-
venile sentence may be used to increase the sentence "if the defendant was
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terns,2 9 the Guidelines place no cap on the number of points an
adult may acquire from his juvenile record.30 Thus, courts
must use a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult de-
fendant's sentence, unless the juvenile proceeding was constitu-
tionally infirm.31
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE USE OF PRIOR
CONVICTIONS
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding is denied
constitutional rights, a conviction resulting from that proceed-
ing is invalid 2 and cannot be used later against the defen-
released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the
instant offense." I& § 4A1.2(d)(2).
If the prior offense was a status offense, it is not included in the calcula-
tion of a person's criminal history score. A status offense is an offense that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult. See Feld, supra note 6, at 692.
Examples of status offenses are underage drinking, curfew violations, running
away from home, associating with immoral persons, and truancy offenses. Id.
Other minor violations are also not counted. According to the Guidelines,
sentences for the following "offenses and offenses similar to them, by
whatever name they are known, are never to be counted: Hitchhiking, Juve-
nile status offenses and truancy, Loitering, Minor traffic infractions, Public in-
toxication, Vagrancy." U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(c)(2).
29. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1991) (Minnesota's
Sentencing Guidelines).
30. Congress looked to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as a model in
developing the Guidelines. Congress thought that Minnesota had been more
successful in sentencing reform than other state or local reform programs.
Congress also believed that the Minnesota Guidelines were substantially simi-
lar to the federal Guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3245.
The Minnesota Guidelines recognized the severe problems of the juvenile
system and chose to limit the use of prior juvenile convictions. Specifically,
Minnesota capped the amount of points that juvenile priors may add to an
adult criminal history score, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 ll.B.4 (West Supp. 1991),
reasoning that juvenile court proceedings do not afford the full procedural
right available in adult courts, and that different legal procedures and safe-
guards make the full use of juvenile procedures unfair, id. § 244 app. comment
II.B.404 (West Supp. 1991).
31. Courts must count each prior sentence that has not been reversed, re-
manded, or found constitutionally invalid in determining the total criminal
history score. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 6. But see United States v.
Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that, under the Guidelines, a
criminal defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for which the
defendant did not receive a term of imprisonment may be counted in calculat-
ing a criminal history score).
32. The Supreme Court has held that the denial of constitutional protec-
tions make a conviction invalid. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38
(1970) (denial of the right to a speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
162 (1968) (denial of trial by jury); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (denial of
appropriate notice); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965) (denial of
1774 [Vol. 75:1769
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dant.s3 In Burgett v. Texas,s 4 the United States Supreme Court
held that if the government obtained a prior conviction in viola-
tion of the defendant's right to counsel, a court applying a re-
cidivism statute may not consider that conviction.35 The
Burgett Court reasoned that a sentencing court using such a
conviction would erode the principle establishing the right to
counsel and cause the defendant to suffer twice from the sixth
amendment deprivation of counsel.3
In Baldasar v. Illinois,37 the Court expanded Burgett, hold-
ing that courts may not use a valid prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction that did not result in incarceration to
enhance a sentence for a later offense.3s The Court set forth
the rationale for its decision in Baldasar in three concur-
rences.39 Justice Marshall's concurrence provided two bases for
right to confront and to cross-examine accusers); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) (denial of the right against self-incrimination); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 517 (1962) (denial of right to counsel).
33. Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 appli-
cation note 6 ("Convictions which the defendant shows to have been
constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the criminal history score.").
34. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
35. Id. at 115. The Court concluded that the admission of a prior criminal
conviction that is constitutionally infirm is inherently prejudicial. I; see also
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (permitting a conviction ob-
tained by violating the rights of the defendant to enhance his punishment for a
later offense would erode the principles creating the rights).
36. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115.
37. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
38. Id at 222-24. In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the
Court held that a prior uncounseled felony conviction could not be used to en-
hance a current sentence. Id. at 449. In other circumstances, the Court has
upheld convictions for one purpose that would not be valid for all purposes.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (conviction of defendant with-
out counsel unconstitutional if he were sentenced to prison; however, the same
conviction is constitutionally valid if the defendant is not sentenced to prison).
Under Baldasar, an uncounseled conviction may not be used for enhance-
ment. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. Under Scott, however, a
person may be found guilty of an offense without the right to the assistance of
counsel, but that person may not be sentenced to even a day of incarceration
without the right to the assistance of counsel at trial. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374.
39. Although Baldasar was a per curium decision, Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun each wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Stewart's
concurrence stated that the prison sentence inflicted on Baldasar violated
Scott, because Baldasar had been sentenced to an increased term of imprison-
ment "only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which
he had not had the assistance of appointed counsel." 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (emphasis added). Because counsel did not represent Baldasar
in his first conviction, Justice Blackmun believed that the conviction was in-
valid and therefore could not be used to support subsequent enhancement. Id
1775
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the decision. First, he stated that the sixth amendment right to
counsel is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."4 In addi-
tion, he argued that convictions that are "invalid for purposes
of imposing a sentence of imprisonment" for the original of-
fense remain invalid for enhancing a later sentence of impris-
onment under a repeat-offender statute.4'
C. JUVENmE RIGHTS IN ADJUDICATIONS
The juvenile justice system differs fundamentally from the
adult criminal justice system.42 While the adult system seeks to
punish, the juvenile system traditionally seeks to treat.4 To
at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Even the Baldasar dissenters had no prob-
lem with the Burgett holding that disallowed sentence enhancement due to
constitutionally invalid prior felony conviction. Id at 232-33 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 442 (1963)). Gideon v. Wainwright established the right to counsel
for indigent criminal defendants. 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
41. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
also expressed concern that misdemeanor convictions might be less reliable
than felony convictions, because of inadequate preparation on the part of the
defense, the prosecution, and the courts, and because of "assembly-line jus-
tice." Id. at 228 n.2.
42. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
43. The modern juvenile justice system traces its origins to the Progres-
sive reform movement in Illinois in 1899. That year, the State of Illinois estab-
lished the first juvenile court. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 IM. Laws 131 (1899).
For a history of the juvenile reform movement, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Re-
form" An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
The Progressive reformers sought to create a separate system for juveniles
to replace the traditional common law system that did not distinguish between
juvenile offenders and adult offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16
(1967). The common law deemed children under the age of seven incapable of
committing crimes. Id. at 16. Children between the ages of seven and four-
teen were rebuttably presumed to be incapable of committing criminal acts.
In re Gladys RL, 1 Cal. 3d 855, 863, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677-78, 464 P.2d 127, 133-34
(1970). The law treated children over fourteen like adults. Feld, Progressiv-
ism and the Control of Youth." The Emergence of the Juvenile System, in LAw
AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMNAL LAw 173, 185-86
(1983). Once the court decided the threshold question of whether the child
had mens rea to commit the criminal act, the proceedings did not vary from
adult proceedings. Id. A child found guilty would be sentenced as any other
convict. Id.
Under the Progressive movement reforms, juvenile proceedings ceased be-
ing "criminal," but instead became "civil actions." See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
One Texas court summarized the use of terminology in the juvenile system as
follows:
The creators of the juvenile system rejected the adult example as
punitive, cruel and nonrehabilitative. This rejection was so extreme
that even the vocabulary of the criminal system was discarded and re-
place by more palatable terminology. Instead of being "arrested,"
1776 [Vol. 75:1769
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this end, the juvenile justice system avoids the strict standards
of the adult judicial system by focusing on the individual treat-
ment and rehabilitation of the offender," instead of the offense
committed.45 Because the juvenile system was "for the good of
the child,"' traditional notions of adult criminal due process
and procedure were thought unnecessary, if not detrimental, to
cure the juvenile of the "disease of delinquency."47 To achieve
"jailed" and "indicted," juveniles were to be "taken into custody,"
"detained" and a "petition" was to be filed for further "protection."
Terms such as "trial," "criminal," and "imprisonment" were replaced
with the softer terms of "hearing," "juvenile delinquent" or "a child
in need of supervision," and "commitment." Medical metaphors such
as diagnosis, rehabilitation, and counseling accented the new juvenile
vocabulary in order to better characterize the type of treatment
intended.
Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
44. See Feld, supra note 6, at 695 ("[b]y separating children from adults
and providing a rehabilitative alternative to punishment, juvenile courts re-
jected the jurisprudence of criminal law and its procedural safeguards, such as
juries and lawyers").
45. Under the traditional juvenile court approach, the actual crime or of-
fense that the juvenile commits should not affect the severity or length of the
court's intervention, because each individual child's needs are different and
courts cannot determine those needs in advance merely by looking at the com-
mitted offense. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 151 (1984).
46. The idea that the state in its role as parens patriae is "for the good of
the child" is originally a Spartan theory. State ex rel Londerholm v. Owens,
197 Kan. 212, 220, 416 P.2d 259, 267 (1966). Under this theory, the state may
exercise its authority to guard and direct the child. Id. Early reformers be-
lieved a child had a right to be subject to custody, not liberty. Gault, 387 U.S.
at 17. See generally Fox, supra note 43, at 1188-1221 (discussing the history of
the juvenile reform movement). The Supreme Court has continued to adhere
to the notion that juveniles are subject to custody. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 ("the
juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated
to the State's 'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare
of the child'" (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982))).
The Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), stated,
however, that "[t]he Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining
the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct.
The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the
child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and
punishment." Id. at 554.
47. See Feld, supra note 43, at 181, 185-86 (applying medical metaphors to
the criminal justice system encouraged the juvenile court to collect "as much
information as possible about the child, since a rational scientific analysis of
facts would reveal the proper diagnosis and prescribe the cure").
Juvenile commitment was of an indefinite rather than fixed length be-
cause it was impossible to judge in advance how long a juvenile would need
treatment. See Feld, supra note 45, at 151. Other notions unique to the juve-
nile system also prevailed. The system recognizes confessions by juveniles at
court proceedings as the commencement of the juvenile's "therapy." Gault,
1991] 1777
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this goal, juvenile sentences were for an indefinite rather than
finite period.4
The policies of the juvenile justice system, however, caused
juveniles to suffer from "the worst of both worlds. '49 Juveniles
adjudicated within the juvenile system received neither the
same constitutional protections as adults nor the care and treat-
ment postulated for children.50
The juvenile justice process changed in 1967 when the
Supreme Court issued its landmark decision In re Gault.51 The
Gault Court extended to juveniles many, but not all, traditional
fifth 52 and sixth 53 amendment constitutional criminal protec-
387 U.S. at 51. Moreover, the idea that adult due process is detrimental to the
treatment of juveniles persists. In United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285 (5th
Cir. 1976), Judge Wisdom stated that "juvenile delinquency proceedings are in-
tended to be 'intimate, informal, protective and paternalistic.' ... Therefore,
the imposition upon the federal juvenile system of a jury trial right would be
the same 'regressive and undesirable step' that a similar imposition would be
upon the states." IMi at 1292.
48. See Feld, supra note 6, at 700. The theory behind the juvenile system
was to determine the "needs of the child and society rather than adjudicating
criminal conduct." Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. Guidance and rehabilitation, not re-
sponsibility, guilt or punishment, were the objectives of the process. Id
Juveniles were to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" as a result of their en-
counters with the justice system, and the procedures they encountered were to
be "clinical" rather than "punitive." Feld, supra note 43, at 181, 185-86; Gault,
387 U.S. at 15-16. Courts continue to view the juvenile commitment process as
rehabilitative and treatment oriented, and not punitive, In re Eric J., 159 Cal.
Rptr. 317, 321, 601 P.2d 549, 554 (1980), and sentencing in a majority of states is
still indefinite in many cases. See Feld, supra note 6, at 711; Feld, The Juve-
nile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishmen4 Treatmen and the
Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REv. 821, 849 (1988).
49. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
50. Id, at 556.
51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. The fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tions.54 The Court rejected applying a lower standard of rights
to juvenile proceedings simply because those proceedings were
labelled "civil,"a'  because juvenile commitment, whether la-
belled "criminal" or "civil," is still incarceration.- The Gault
Court held that the youth of the offender does not justify con-
viction in a "kangaroo court,"57 and concluded that the Consti-
tution requires, at a minimum, fourteenth amendment due
process5s procedural regularity in juvenile proceedings.5 9
Despite Gault and its progeny,6° courts still retain great
discretion in dealing with juveniles.61 Unlike adult sentencing,
54. The Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. Specifically, the
Court held that juveniles, like adults, have the right to sufficient notice of the
charges against them, id. at 33, to counsel, id. at 41, to confront and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, id. at 56, and to protect themselves against self-incrimination,
id, at 55.
55. Id. at 50.
56. 1&
57. Id. at 28. The Court in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), revisited
the applicability of the due process clause to juvenile proceedings, stating that
"[t]here is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile pro-
ceedings." Id. at 263.
58. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
59. I& at 27-28.
60. One Texas court summarized the eight main cases defining juvenile
rights in the following manner.
In chronological order these cases established: (1) protections against
coerced confessions, Haley v. Ohio, [332 U.S. 596 (1948)]; (2) proce-
dural requirements for certification hearings, Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S.
541 [1966]; (3) the rights of notice, counsel confrontation, cross-exami-
nation, and protection against self-incrimination, [In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967)]; (4) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, [397
U.S. 358 (1970)]; (5) that a jury trial is not required, [McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)]; (6) double jeopardy protections,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 [(1975)]; (7) the validity of pre-trial deten-
tion, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 [(1984)]; and, (8) a diminished
Fourth Amendment standard applicable to school searches, New
Jersey v. TL.O., 460 U.S. 325 [(1985)].
Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citations to state stat-
utes omitted).
61. Juvenile court sentencing rules are distinct from those in adult courts.
See Feld, supra note 48, at 837-38. More sentencing discretion is allowed in ju-
venile sentencing than in adult sentencing "because of paternalistic assump-
tions about the ability to rehabilitate children." Id at 880. The juvenile justice
system continues to believe in a "rehabilitative" model of sentencing.
Although many states have begun to move away from this model and toward
the determinative sentencing model, most jurisdictions sentence juveniles for
indeterminate periods. Id. at 849. When they impose indeterminate sentences,
judges often commit the juvenile offenders to the state juvenile corrections
agency. Id at 850. These agencies then determine when to release the juve-
nile. IM
Juvenile courts continue to prefer for individualized decisionmaking and
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present offense and prior record are not the sole criteria for
punishment in the juvenile context.62 Instead, judges have a
wide range of discretion. They may consider numerous factors,
such as race, sex, and other factors reflecting biases6s that are
not considered in adult cases.64 By using a multi-factor analy-
sis, courts may punish similarly situated offenders differently.6 5
Notwithstanding Gault's promise of procedural regular-
ity,66 the Court left open the question of how closely it would
require the juvenile court to resemble an adult criminal court.
In particular, although guaranteeing many sixth amendment
protections, the Court did not address whether juvenile offend-
ers had the right to a jury trial.
D. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
Because the founders saw the jury as a check on the new
nation's criminal justice system,67 they provided all persons the
treatment of juveniles. See Fink, Determining the Future ChliZ& Actors on the
Juvenile Court Stage, in 2 FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS: THE ROLE OF THE JU-
VENILE COURT 270, 276 (F. Hartmann ed. 1987) (noting that "the court must
consider not merely the interests and circumstances of the present child, fam-
ily, and community, but also must attempt to envision within the significant
limits of the state of the art of prediction the interests and circumstances, as
well as the probable effects of particular modes of intervention, upon the fu-
ture child") (emphasis in original). Juvenile dispositions are not fixed, but
rather depend on a judge's prediction of the child's future. Id.
62. Feld, supra note 6, at 711 (one-third of states use the present offense
and prior record approach in sentencing juveniles).
63. See Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Courts: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRnm. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1252-80 (1989) (race, sex, and pretrial detention all affect
juvenile dispositions).
64. Numerous discretionary factors eliminated from consideration in adult
sentencing under the Guidelines continue to affect juvenile dispositions. Com-
pare 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988) (requiring the elimination of race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socioeconomic factors from affecting sentencing under the
Guidelines) with Feld, supra note 63, at 1261-66, 1279-80 (asserting that race
and sex affect juvenile sentencing).
65. See Feld, supra note 48, at 873-74 ("commitment and release decisions
[are] so 'individualized' that no factors could explain the differentiation in
treatment of youths by an institution"). In addition, with the court's approval,
the prosecutor may elect to "waive" the most serious juvenile offenders into
the adult system. See Feld, supra note 6, at 701-08. A juvenile's race also af-
fects the waiver decisions. Id. at 704.
66. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 543 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937) (trial
by jury provides protection in criminal proceedings against "[a]rbitrary im-
peachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbi-
trary punishments upon arbitrary convictions").
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right to a jury trial.68 The Supreme Court has extended the
sixth amendment guarantees of trial by jury to defendants in
state criminal proceedings,69 finding this right necessary to pre-
vent government oppression.7" Later, in Baldwin v. New
York,71 the Court held that every defendant charged with an
offense punishable by more than six months of imprisonment,
whether or not labeled "petty," is entitled to a trial by jury.72
The Supreme Court, however, has not required that
juveniles faced with six months or more of confinement receive
jury trials. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 3 the Court, in a plu-
rality opinion,74 refused to extend the juvenile due process
68. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Court in Gault also
saw the protection against self-incrimination as necessary for juveniles to pre-
vent government oppression and coercion. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
69. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Both the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights explicitly mention this fundamental right. The Consti-
tution provides two explicit grants of the rights of citizen to a trial by jury.
article MI, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "the trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury," and the sixth
amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
70. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155. Although the Court acknowledged that a
system of trial by jury has weaknesses and the potential for abuse, id at 156, it
nevertheless believed in its importance:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should
be enforced and justice administered.... Those who wrote our consti-
tutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate ene-
mies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher author-
ity ... Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor and against the complian biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a
jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the
single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions
in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision
about the exercise of official power - a reluctance to entrust plenary
powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a
group of judges.
Id at 155-56 (emphasis added); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72
(1970) ("the primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppres-
sion by the Government").
71. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
72. I& at 69. In all states with indefinite sentencing for juveniles offenses,
the authorized sentence for an offense would fall within the Baldwin limits.
See id.
73. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
74. The Court wrote a total of five opinions in the McKeiver decision. No
single opinion gathered more than four supporters. Chief Justice Burger, Jus-
tice Stewart, and Justice White joined Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion.
Justice White, however, also wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Harlan
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rights established in Gault75 to include the right to a jury trial
in state delinquency proceedings.76 The McKeiver Court held
concurred in judgment, but wrote his own opinion. Justice Brennan concurred
in judgment as to McKeiver's appeal, but dissented in the companion case of
In re Burrus. Justices Douglas, Black and Marshall joined in a common
dissent.
75. When a court refuses to extend an adult protection in the juvenile
court context, "it must be justified by interests of society, reflected in that
unique institution, or of juveniles themselves, of sufficient substance to render
tolerable the costs and burdens .... which the exception will entail in individ-
ual cases." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1975). The McKeiver Court
retreated from fully applying the due process analysis of Gault. Instead, the
Court believed its duty was to "ascertain the precise impact of the due process
requirement" on juvenile proceedings. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541 (quoting In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967)).
76. The Court did not address the question of whether juveniles have a
right to a jury trial in federal delinquency proceedings. In Nieves v. United
States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), decided after Gault but before Mc-
Keiver, a three-judge district court held that
[a Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act] proceeding which may lead to a
juvenile's loss of liberty by incarceration, for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury, is in nature a criminal prosecution,
and the constitutionally guaranteed right of a trial by jury in all fed-
eral criminal prosecutions must, therefore accompany such a
proceeding.
Id at 1004. Courts considering Nieves after McKeiver have held that Nieves is
no longer good law. In United States v. King, 482 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973), the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the McKeiver Court
"regarded the juvenile delinquency law under consideration, which was not
significantly different from the federal statute, as not being of a criminal na-
ture so as to invoke all of the protections required in a criminal prosecution."
I& at 455. In United States v. Cotton, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971), the Eighth
Circuit simply found no difference between state and federal adjudications.
The court quoted McKeiver, asserting "'that trial by jury in the juvenile
court's adjudicative state is not a constitutional requirement."' Id at 110. In
United States v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit held
that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act denying trial by jury "does not vio-
late the Sixth Amendment or Due Process standards of fundamental fairness,
and there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in such proceedings." Id. at
948. Similarly, in United States v. Duboise, 604 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1979), the
Tenth Circuit found that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act did not permit
trial by jury. Id. at 648. This court viewed the juvenile proceeding as "a civil
rather than a criminal prosecution." Id. at 650. Because "adjudication of juve-
nile delinquency and commitment under the Juvenile Delinquency Act is not
a conviction of or sentence for a crime," i. at 649-50, the court reasoned that
the hearing need only "'measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment,'" id. at 651 (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533-34). The Duboise
court did provide an alternative to juveniles seeking a jury trial. "The juvenile
status does not deny the juvenile a jury trial. He can, if he wishes to have it,
elect to be tried under the adult procedure which would give him a right to a
jury trial." Id. at 652 (emphasis in the original). The implication of the Tenth
Circuit's ruling is that juveniles do have a sixth amendment right to a trial by
jury, but that right is limited to an adult criminal court.
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that the Constitution did not require eliminating all differences
in the procedural treatment of juveniles.77 The Court reasoned
that juvenile courts "treat" children, instead of punishing
them.78 Thus, denying a juvenile a jury trial did not create a
"fundamental unfairness. '79
As McKeiver demonstrated, when a proceeding is not crim-
inal, courts apply a fourteenth amendment "fundamental fair-
ness" standard, rather than a "selective incorporation"80
standard.8 ' To determine which procedural protections a state
must provide to meet the "fundamental fairness" standard,
courts weigh the state's parens patriae8 2 interests against the
individual's liberty interest.8 3 The McKeiver Court used the
77. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
78. "Supervision or confinement is aimed at rehabilitation, not at convinc-
ing the juvenile of his error simply by imposing pains and penalties." Id at
552 (White, J., concurring); see also Feld, supra note 6, at 696 (discussing Mc-
Keiver).
In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Court similarly concluded that,
in the "civil" commitment of an adult in psychiatric facilities, the defendant is
not entitled to full due process rights. Id at 368-74. As in McKeiver, the
state's primary interest in treating the defendant allows for lower constitu-
tional protections. The Court held that the treatment purpose of psychiatric
detention and the State's disavowed interest in punishment makes the pro-
ceeding civil and not criminal. I& at 370. The Allen Court believed that "[tihe
state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves." Id at 373.
79. The Court has held that the Constitution does not mandate the elimi-
nation of all differences between the treatment of juveniles and adults. Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984). The Court does not apply a strict constitu-
tional due process standard in evaluating juvenile proceedings. Instead, the
Court asks whether the given procedure is compatible "with the 'fundamental
fairness' demanded by the Due Process Clause." IM
80. The "selective incorporation" standard makes the most of the Bill of
Rights' protections applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Selective
incorporation applies the specific federal right being incorporated and all of its
case law to the states. For a further discussion of selective incorporation, see
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, Cun=AL PROCEDURE § 2.5 (1985).
81. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543; cf. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
The Court reserves full sixth amendment protections only for criminal
proceedings. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1976) (a proceeding that
results "in loss of liberty does not ipso facto mean that the proceeding is a
'criminal prosecution' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment"). When the
state's goal is treatment and not punishment of the individual involved, the
Court requires only "fundamental fairness," not full "selective incorporation"
procedural protections. Cf. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373-75.
82. The state acts as guardian or parent of the juvenile.
83. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 265; see also Allen, 478 U.S. at 373-74 (focusing
on state's interest in treatment rather than punishment).
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"fundamental fairness" standard to balance constitutional due
process requirements with the nonpunitive objectives of the ju-
venile court system.84 Despite noting serious shortcomings in
the juvenile justice system,85 the Court maintained that a jury
84. In Schall, the Court stated that in evaluating the constitutionality of
the treatment of juveniles, it tries to strike a balance between the "informal-
ity" and "flexibility" of juvenile proceedings and the "fundamental fairness"
demands of the due process clause. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a
matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what
has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. The Court believed that the right to a jury trial in
juvenile court would not greatly strengthen the factfinding process and, in
fact, jury trials could prevent the juvenile court from functioning in its unique
manner. Id. at 547.
Further, the Court views juvenile incarceration, like incarceration of the
mentally ill, as a balancing of the state's interests and the interests of the indi-
vidual. It also views the period of incarceration as volitional. Compare Mc-
Keiver, 403 U.S. at 552 (White, J., concurring) (a juvenile court may confine a
delinquent until he is age 21, but the confinement will last no longer than it
takes the delinquent to demonstrate that he is no longer a risk if returned to
his family) with Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 (any time the patient can show that he
is no longer found to be dangerous, he is to be discharged).
85. The Supreme Court took particular note of shortcomings with juve-
nile judges. "Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart,
protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged." McKeiver, 403
U.S. at 544. In an accompanying footnote, the Court pointed out that one-half
of all juvenile judges did not have college degrees; one-fifth of all judges had
received no college education at all; and one-fifth of the judges were not mem-
bers of any bar. I at 544 n.4.
The Court, however, did not consider the system fatally flawed. The
Court reaffirmed its faith in the juvenile system, despite the system's acknowl-
edged problems.
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say
that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not
hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant to say... that the sys-
tem cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals.... We are reluctant to
disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new and dif-
ferent ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young, and we
feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the
jury trial.
Id. at 547.
In his concurrence, however, Justice White sought to restrict the Court
holding to juveniles charged in the juvenile court system. Id at 551.
We have not, however, considered the juvenile case a criminal pro-
ceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and hence auto-
matically subject to all of the restrictions normally applicable in
criminal cases. The question here is one of due process of law and I
join the plurality opinion concluding that the States are not required
by that clause to afford jury trials in juvenile courts where juveniles
are charged with improper acts.
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is not necessary for "accurate factfinding" in the juvenile con-
text.s6 The Court believed that juries might be disruptive to
the "unique nature of the juvenile process,"' 7 and that other
procedural rights adequately protect the accused juvenile.ss
E. FEDERAL COURT APPUCATION OF SEcwION 4A1.2(d)
Although federal courts have addressed several issues re-
garding section 4A1.2(d),8 9 few have addressed whether, be-
cause of the unique nature of juvenile procedures, using this
86. 1d. at 543.
87. Id. at 540.
88. Id (quoting In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 346, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970)).
The Court, as support for its decision, cited the President's Comm'n on Law
Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Crime 38 (1967). "Had the Commission deemed this vital to the in-
tegrity of the juvenile process, or to the handling of juveniles, surely a recom-
mendation or suggestion to this effect would have appeared." Mc~eiver, 463
U.S. at 544-48.
Eleven states provide juveniles a right to jury trials in all cases. See
ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-501 (1989) (six-per-
son jury for felony and misdemeanor cases); MAss. ANN. LAWS cl. 119, § 55A
(Law. Co-op. 1990); MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 1990) (six-per-
son jury); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521(1) (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-31(A)
(1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1991) (six-person jury); TEX.
FAm. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (Vernon 1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (1990)
(twelve-person jury); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.31(2) (West 1990); WYO. STAT. § 14-
6-223(c) (1990).
Other states provide juveniles limited rights to jury trials. See ALA. CODE
§ 15-19-1 (1990) (jury trials available for juveniles only if the defendant waives
the right to be tried in juvenile court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (1989) (if
charge is one that would be triable by a jury if defendant were an adult, the
judge may grant the juvenile the right to a jury trial); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. § 26-8-31 (1990) (cases generally heard by the court, except that the court
may, on its own motion, order a six-person jury); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-129
(1990) (same).
89. The legislative history of the Guidelines, however, is devoid of men-
tion of Gault, McKeiver, or any specific reason for including juvenile adjudica-
tions in the criminal history score. The courts, therefore, are left without
guidance as to why the systematic inclusion of juvenile sentences in criminal
history scores is constitutionally permissible.
Several federal courts have accepted the constitutional validity of sentence
enhancement under § 4A12(d) without question. See United States v. Chester,
919 F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1466
(10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, Ill S. Ct. 990 (1991); United States v. Brown, 903
F.2d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 11 S. Ct. 160 (1990); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 1252,
1254 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Nichols, 740 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
Other courts have addressed various issues dealing with enhancement
based on juvenile incarceration, holding that incarceration in a juvenile facility
is an "imprisonment" for Guidelines purposes, and that using juvenile incar-
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section to enhance adult sentences violates the due process
ceration to enhance adult sentences does not violate due process. See United
States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1991), stating that
We can think of no reason why the Commission might have wanted to
measure the length of [adult sentences under § 4A1.2(d)(2)] using a
different method from that employed in measuring adult sentences
under all of the other closely related provisions. Thus we conclude
that the term "sentence of confinement" in section 4A12(d)(2) has
the same meaning as the term "sentence of imprisonment" in the
other provisions.
Id. at 933; see also United States v. Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir.)
("commitment to a juvenile facility constitutes an 'imprisonment' for the pur-
poses of applying the ... Guidelines"), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 357 (1990);
United States v. Bucaro, 898 F.2d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1990) (a commitment follow-
ing an adjudication of delinquency by a state juvenile court can be considered
an "incarceration" under the Guidelines); United States v. Kirby, 893 F.2d 867,
868 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir.
1989) (commitment to juvenile hall was a "sentence to confinement" under the
Guidelines), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990). If juvenile incarceration is a
"sentence to confinement" under the Guidelines, then courts must increase
that person's criminal history score by two points. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).
If the juvenile incarceration is not a "sentence to confinement," however, then
the incarceration falls within the residual exception and increases the criminal
history score by only one point. Id. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B).
The First Circuit, in United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1005 (1991), simply narrowed the definition of status of-
fense not counted by the Guidelines in calculating criminal history scores, as a
way around the Guidelines' definitional problems. The Unger court held that
in determining whether a juvenile offense was a status offense (not counted
under the Guidelines) or a non-status offense (countable), courts should look
not to the offense the juvenile was found guilty of violating, but to "the sub-
stance of the underlying... offense." Id. at 762-63. But see United States v.
Martinez, 905 F.2d 251, 253-54 (9th Cir. 1990) (state law determines whether an
offense runs afoul of the Guidelines).
Many years after the incident, the Unger court decided what was in the
mind of the juvenile judge at the time Unger was sentenced and what crime
Unger was guilty of violating. As a juvenile, Unger was alleged to have com-
mitted conduct that constituted breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods,
and assault and battery. The Rhode Island Family Court did not find him
guilty of these specific offenses, which would have lead to a finding of "delin-
quency," but instead judged him to be "wayward." Unger, 915 F.2d at 763.
Rhode Island law defined these terms as follows:
14-1-3. Definitions.
(F) The term "delinquent" when applied to a child shall mean
and include any child -
Who has committed any offense which, if committed by
an adult, would constitute a felony, or who has on more than
one occasion violated any of the other laws of the state or of
the United States or any of the ordinances of cities and
towns, other than ordinances relating to the operation of mo-
tor vehicles.
(G) The term "wayward" when applied to a child shall mean and
include any child -
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clause. 9° To illustrate this issue, consider the Ninth Circuit's
1989 decision in United States v. Williams.9 1 In Williams, af-
ter considering Williams's prior juvenile adjudications, the sen-
tencing judge applied section 4A1.2(d) to enhance Williams's
sentence by over a year.92 Williams argued that the judge could
(1) Who has deserted his or her home without good or suffi-
cient cause; or
(2) Who habitually associates with dissolute, vicious or im-
moral persons; or
(3) Who is leading an immoral or vicious life; or
(4) Who is habitually disobedient to the reasonable and law-
ful commands of his or her parent or parents, guardian
or other lawful custodian; or
(5) Who, being required by chapter 19 of title 16 to attend
school, wilfully and habitually absents himself there-
from, or habitually violates rules and regulations of the
school when he or she attends; or
(6) Who has on any occasion violated any of the laws of the
state or of the United States or any of the ordinances of
cities and towns, other than ordinances relating to the
operation of motor vehicles.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3 (Supp. 1990). Under Rhode Island law, "wayward-
ness" is normally a status offense and does not denote specific criminal wrong-
doing. Id An adjudication of "delinquency," however, would have required a
finding of guilt equal to that of a felony. Id. In either case, a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is required by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360-61
(1970). This process of finding a juvenile guilty, one way or another, has
shades of Gault's warning of "kangaroo courts." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28
(1967); see also Feld, supra note 6, at 699 ("[m]any courts now charge juveniles
with minor criminal offenses instead of status offense, for which there are no
dispositional limits").
90. United States v. Booten, 914 F.2d 1352, 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990)
(equating a juvenile court adjudication of guilt with an adult criminal convic-
tion does not violate due process); United States v. Rangel-Navarro, 907 F.2d
109, 110 (9th Cir. 1990) (juvenile proceedings for acts that constitute criminal
behavior for adults "are criminal proceedings for juveniles").
91. 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990).
92. Id. at 213. Williams pled guilty to one count of unarmed bank rob-
bery. Williams criminal history score was ten. Four of these points were en-
hancements due to two juvenile adjudications. These adjuducations took place
after the defendant committed two bank robberies when he was a juvenile. In
1984, a California juvenile court ordered Williams to serve 180 days in the
county juvenile hall for committing one of the robberies. Williams contended
that this commitment "did not constitute a 'sentence of imprisonment' under
the Sentencing Guidelines." Brief for Appellant at 7, United States v. Wil-
liams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017). In a second juvenile proceed-
ing later in the same year, Williams was committed to the California Youth
Authority for the second bank robbery. Williams, 891 F.2d at 213. Had Wil-
liams's juvenile sentences not been included in his criminal history score, his
sentence would have been in the 30 to 37 month range instead of the 46 to 57
month range. Id at 214.
The court in Williams was only the second appellate court to confront a
case involving § 4A1.2(d). The first appellate court to mention § 4A.2(d) in a
1991] 1787
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
not include two juvenile bank robbery adjudications in his
criminal history score,93 because their inclusion violated the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.94 Although he con-
ceded that a juvenile can be denied a jury trial without violat-
ing the Constitution,95  Williams argued that Baldasar
prohibited a sentencing judge from using an adjudication re-
sulting from those proceedings to enhance a later adult
sentence.9
The Ninth Circuit held that even if a juvenile sentence is
imposed without a jury trial, courts may still use the sentence
to enhance an adult sentence under the Guidelines.97 In reach-
ing its decision, the court narrowly read the Baldasar holding
to apply only to cases denying the right to counsel.98 If
published opinion was the Eighth Circuit in United States v. White, 888 F.2d
1252 (8th Cir. 1989). The White court, however, did not address the constitu-
tionality of § 4A1.2(d). Id at 1254.
The Williams court was the first to address two major constitutional is-
sues involved under the Guidelines. The appellant phrased the issue: 'Does
the provision of the Sentencing Guidelines for increases in a defendant's crimi-
nal history score and hence increases in the applicable guideline range based
on prior juvenile adjudications for which there was no right to a jury trial vio-
late the due process clause of the fifth amendment?" Brief for Appellant at 1,
United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017). The ap-
pellee phrased the issue: "Whether the district court erred by considering de-
fendant's prior juvenile convictions in computing defendant's applicable
sentencing guideline range." Brief for Appellee at 1, United States v. Wil-
liams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017).
93. Williams, 891 F.2d at 213. Williams had earlier agreed to the prosecu-
tion's plea bargain agreement. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, United States v. Wil-
liams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017).
94. Williams, 891 F.2d at 214.
95. Id. Although conceding McKeiver does not require a jury trial for
juveniles, Williams pointed out that the McKeiver Court "did not address the
question of whether such a juvenile adjudication can later be used to enhance
an adult sentence." Brief for Appellant at 9, United States v. Williams, 891
F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017).
96. Williams, 891 F.2d at 214. Williams contended that to "use a prior ju-
venile adjudication or sentence to enhance a later adult sentence substantially
equates the juvenile and criminal processes" and is inconsistent with Mc-
Keiver. Brief for Appellant at 10, United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th
Cir. 1989) (No. 89-50017). Williams also contended that under Baldasar, "an
adult cannot have a criminal sentence enhanced because of a conviction at a
prior proceeding to which the right to a jury trial did not attach." Williams,
891 F.2d at 215.
97. Williams, 891 F.2d at 215.
98. I& In Baldasar, the first conviction was valid for the punishment in-
flicted (a $159 fine and a year of probation), Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222,
223-24 (1980) (per curiam), but not a valid conviction for punitive incarcera-
tion, id. The Williams court stated that although the Baldasar Court con-
cluded that an uncounseled conviction that is invalid for the purpose of
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McKeiver allows a juvenile court to deprive a juvenile of liberty
without first providing a jury trial,99 the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that courts may use a sentence imposed as a result of that pro-
ceeding to later enhance an adult deprivation of liberty. 00
H. CONTINUING THE 'WORST OF BOTH WORLDS"
In addressing the use of section 4A1.2(d) for enhancement
purposes, an important distinction exists between the constitu-
tionality of using prior juvenile adjudications to enhance adult
sentences and the fairness of using juvenile disposition as the
enhancement mechanism. Although distinct conceptually,
these two issues are closely related because of the role that pro-
viding juveniles the right to a jury trial plays in curing defects
in section 4A1.2(d). Part A discusses the adjudication issue,
while Part B examines the disposition issue.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 4A1.2(d)
Section 4A1.2(d) is inconsistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent. It is premised on the faulty notion that the Supreme
Court's holding in McKeiver allows courts to use a sentence im-
imposing a prison sentence is also invalid for the purpose of enhancing a sen-
tence, this holding did not apply to the Williams case. Williams, 891 F.2d at
214-15.
99. The Williams court noted that although it is unconstitutional to de-
prive a misdemeanant of his liberty where the defendant was denied counsel,
"it is not unconstitutional to deprive a juvenile of liberty without a jury trial."
Williams, 891 F.2d at 215.
100. I& The Williams court stated that Williams's prior juvenile convic-
tions were constitutionally valid for imposing a "sentence of imprisonment" on
juvenile offenders. Id. The court, in making this assumption, implicitly relied
on the McKeiver holding, which was based on treatment and rehabilitation of
the juvenile, and did not justify imprisonment of the child for punitive ends.
The Williams court cited pre-Guidelines cases for the rationale that a
judge could consider the fact that a defendant was found not guilty of a prior
offense in enhancing a present offense. Williams, 891 F.2d at 215 (citing
United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Williams, 782 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court stated that prior to the
Guidelines, sentencing judges could consider factors that lacked full due pro-
cess guarantees. Thus, judges considering sentencing after the adoption of the
Guidelines can consider prior adjudication where the defendant received coun-
sel. I&
The Williams court concluded that the use of Williams's prior, nonjury
adjudications was not a violation of Williams's due process rights. Id Minne-
sota courts considering the problem of enhancement under its sentencing
guidelines also have held that no violation of due process occurs when courts
use prior juvenile convictions without the right to jury trials to enhance adult
sentences. See State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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posed during a juvenile proceeding later to enhance a sentence
imposed in an adult proceeding.'0 ' The problem with using
McKeiver as precedent for section 4A1.2(d) is that the assump-
tions about the juvenile justice system's nature underlying the
McKeiver Court's decision do not survive when applied in adult
sentencing contexts.102 The McKeiver Court made two assump-
tions to justify providing juveniles with a lower constitutional
standard of due process: 03 that juvenile proceedings result in
treatment, not punishment,10 4 and that juvenile proceedings
will not detrimentally affect the juvenile when she reaches the
age of majority. 05
Nowhere in its explanation of section 4A1.2(d) does the
101. Unconstitutional convictions may not be considered when determining
the criminal history score of a defendant. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 6.
The Sentencing Commission, however, expressly includes all juvenile offenses,
with a few exceptions, in the defendant's criminal history score. Id.
§§ 4A1.2(c), 4A1.2(d). Assuming that the Sentencing Commission was aware
of the relevant precedents regarding juvenile offense when it formulated the
Guidelines, the Commission must have concluded that enhancement of adult
sentences by use of juvenile prior adjudications was constitutional (no Guide-
lines comment makes note of any problem at all with the constitutional use of
juvenile offenses in calculating criminal history scores).
102. See Zimring, Notes Towards Jurisprudence of Waiver, in MAJOR Is-
SUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION & TRAiNIG: READINGS IN PUBLIC
POLICY 193, 197 (1980).
103. When judging the procedural fairness of juvenile proceedings, the
Supreme Court uses a fourteenth amendment "fundamental fairness" stan-
dard that is less stringent than the comparable adult "selective incorporation"
standard. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
104. See Feld, supra note 45, at 248 n.415 ("[t]he fundamental justification
in juvenile jurisprudence for denying jury trials and, more basically, for main-
taining a juvenile justice system separate from the adult one is based on the
difference between punishment and treatment").
105. Inherent in the Court's decisions providing juveniles with fewer pro-
tections is the Court's assumption that children will be protected from the ef-
fects of juvenile delinquency proceedings in the future. See supra notes 77-88
and accompanying text. The McKeiver court based its decision on the fact that
a finding of juvenile delinquency "is significantly different from and less oner-
ous than a finding of criminal guilt." Id. at 540 (emphasis in the original). In
McKeiver, Justice White assumed that the juvenile delinquency proceeding
would not "brand" the child a criminal and that the juvenile's period of con-
finement would last only until the child reached age 21 or until "his behavior
demonstrates" that he is no longer a risk, whichever is earlier. Id. at 552
(White, J., concurring); see also Fink, supra note 61, at 276.
"'The purpose of juvenile courts, and laws relating to juvenile delin-
quency, is to carry out a modern method of dealing with youthful offenders, so
that there may be no criminal record against immature youth to cause detri-
mental local gossip and future handicaps because of childhood errors and in-
discretions."' S**** S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 566 (Me. 1973) (quoting Wade
v. Warden of State Prison, 145 Me. 120, 126, 73 A.2d 128, 131 (1950)). This dif-
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United States Sentencing Commission account for these as-
sumptions.1°6 Consequently, courts upholding the use of sec-
tion 4A1.2(d) rest their decisions on a faulty understanding of
the constitutional underpinnings that allow juvenile disposi-
tions absent a jury trial.10 7
1. The Need for Constitutionally Valid Convictions
Courts may not constitutionally use a sentence stemming
from a juvenile conviction that is unconstitutional by adult
standards to enhance a later adult sentence. Thus, courts prop-
erly applying the constitutional limits on enhancement'08 do
not consider sentences stemming from uncounseled juvenile ad-
judications when sentencing an adult.1°9 Courts applying sec-
tion 4A1.2(d) to enhance adult sentences, however, imply that
the limits on enhancement do not apply when the constitu-
tional right denied the juvenile was the right to a jury trial.1 °
As in Baldasar, when a court uses a prior juvenile adjudication
in which a lower standard of due process was provided to en-
hance an adult sentence, that court threatens all adult defend-
ants by opening the door to enhancement based on looser
constitutional protections.' Consequently, such enhancement
ference between adult and juvenile proceedings is crucial. Cf. Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
In addition, FED. R. EvID. 609(d) prohibits using a juvenile adjudication to
attack the credibility of an accused.
106. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
107. Some judges have already reached this conclusion. The theory of be-
nevolent treatment that is the underpinning of the juvenile justice system
does not provide an adequate rationale for dispensing with the constitutional
protections provided adults. In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 605 (La.) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
108. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
109. Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987); Grant v.
White, 579 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1978).
110. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989), cert de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990).
111. In addition to the failure to provide juveniles with a right to a trial by
jury, juvenile standards for probable cause hearings and for search and seizure
are lower than in similar adult situations. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340-46 (1985) (a diminished fourth amendment standard applies to
juveniles in school searches). When courts apply § 4A1.2(d), they use prior ju-
venile adjudications to enhance adult sentences even though the prior juvenile
proceedings did not provide full constitutional protections. Using prior juve-
nile adjudications in this manner is inconsistent with Baldasar, because
Baldasar allows for enhancement only when the prior proceeding would be
valid for adult imprisonment. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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should be unconstitutional." 2
In Baldwin, the Supreme Court held that all adult and ju-
venile defendants have the right to a jury trial when prosecuted
in adult criminal proceedings that authorize a sentence of more
than six months."13 Because almost every state allows discre-
tionary sentencing of juveniles regardless of the offense com-
mitted,"14 any juvenile proceeding may result in a sentence of
more than six months.115 As a result, all juvenile proceedings
fall within the Baldwin proscription.
In McKeiver, decided less than a year after Baldwin, how-
ever, the Supreme Court denied the right of trial by jury to
juveniles. By selectively denying such a basic constitutional
right so shortly after strongly affirming this right, the Court
suggests that it perceived a fundamental difference in the out-
come and nature of juvenile, as opposed to adult, proceed-
ings."16 The key difference is the therapeutic nature of the
disposition."17
Enhancement under the Guidelines, however, is applied us-
ing a double standard. Courts treat juvenile confinements like
adult sentences"" to the detriment of the adult defendant;" 9
112. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Baldasar,
the Court held that convictions obtained according to the lower misdemeanor
standard for non-incarceration convictions - a standard higher than the juve-
nile standard - cannot be used later for enhancement purposes. See supra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 53
(text of the sixth amendment); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551
(1971) (White, J., concurring) (if a juvenile case is considered a criminal pro-
ceeding as defined by the sixth amendment, it is "automatically subject to all
of the restrictions normally applicable in criminal cases").
114. See Feld, supra note 6, at 711.
115. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (indefinite sentencing).
116. If no substantive difference existed, courts would violate the juvenile's
due process rights whenever they denied juveniles the right to trial by jury.
See Zimring, supra note 102, at 197.
117. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70, 373 (1986) (when the state's
intent is to punish the proceeding must be considered criminal; when the
state's purpose is treating the person, however, the sixth amendment protec-
tions do not apply). The Court has held that when the state's goal is to im-
prove the life of the defendant, the Constitution allows the state more
informality and flexibility in its proceedings. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 263 (1984); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534.
118. Under the Guidelines, adults can receive two points for offenses
where the period of incarceration is at least 60 days and less than one year.
They receive three points for offenses where the period of incarceration is
over one year. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. Juveniles receive two points for all offenses
where the period of imprisonment is 60 days or greater. Id- § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).
119. See Feld, supra note 6, at 718.
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they fail, however, to consider whether use of juvenile adjudi-
cations to enhance adult sentences is valid under the Balasar
standard, when adult due process protections would have been
to the juvenile defendant's advantage.2o
2. McKeiver: Treatment versus Punishment
The sixth amendment does not distinguish between a per-
son's right to a trial by jury and the right to counsel.' 12 In fed-
eral court, therefore, an adult defendant is entitled to all sixth
amendment protections.2 2 Thus, even under the Guidelines, if
a court denied an adult the right to a jury trial in a previous
adult proceeding, a later court would disregard the previous
sentence when calculating the criminal history score.m Courts
applying section 4A1.2(d), however, mistakenly believe that the
enhancement prohibitions do not apply to juvenile proceed-
ings.124 This error stems from a belief that McKeiver author-
ized "sentences of imprisonment"'' 2 for juveniles without a
trial. To remedy this mistake, courts should apply section
4Ai.2(d) in light of the policy undergirding McKeiver.
The Supreme Court approves of lower standards for incar-
ceration procedures only in treatment-oriented proceedings2 6
where the government has disavowed any interest in criminal
prosecution or punishment.2? Only when treatment is the ob-
jective of the juvenile's sentence does McKeiver allow for dif-
ferent sentencing standards and a correspondingly lower level
of due process in juvenile proceedings.2 8 Accordingly, courts
120. For example, under an adult standard, Williams's prior sentence
would not have been upheld because Williams was denied a jury trial. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968). Therefore, under the Guide-
lines, enhancement based on that sentence would have been invalid.
121. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 34 n.13 (1976) ("[w]hatever may be
the merits of 'selective incorporation' under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment makes absolutely no distinction between the right to jury
trial and the right to counsel") (emphasis added).
122. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
123. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 6 ("Convictions which the de-
fendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the
criminal history score.").
124. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990).
125. See, e.g., id. at 215.
126. See also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (lower standards are
allowable in proceedings to confine the mentally ill).
127. A defendant in all criminal prosecutions has the right to an impartial
jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971).
128. See supra notes 77-81 (distinguishing between procedures for treat-
ment and punishment); see also Zimring, supra note 102, at 197.
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should not interpret McKeiver to justify using juvenile convic-
tions with reduced procedural protections for punitive purposes
at the adult level.'" Interpreted in this manner, McKeiver
would not allow courts to enhance an adult's sentence based on
juvenile sentences obtained during proceedings governed by the
lower "fundamental fairness" standard.
Courts should also interpret McKeiver narrowly because
the fundamental policy principles supporting the decision fail
to withstand constitutional muster when expanded beyond
their limited therapeutic bounds.130 If a sentence was imposed
under the guise of therapy, it should remain a therapeutic sen-
tence; it should not be allowed to metamorphosize into a crimi-
nal conviction at the prosecution's convenience.13 1 In the same
vein, enhancing a sentence because of an earlier period of incar-
ceration imposed under a mental illness statute would be inher-
ently unfair.132 Because the procedural protections found
129. This interpretation would conform with the "rule of lenity," which
states that laws whose purpose is to punish must be strictly construed. W. Es-
KRIDGE & P. FRiCKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 658 (1988).
130. See Feld, supra note 6, at 718-20.
131. If a juvenile accepts the rationale of the juvenile justice system and
thinks the outcome - a new environment, educational opportunities, drug re-
habilitation - might help him in the future, he may not contest a juvenile
proceeding. The juvenile, however, cannot be said to have consented to a puni-
tive proceeding, or the later use of this therapeutic proceeding against himself.
The court in United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1991), discussed the
fact that an "indeteminate juvenile sentence may not reflect the seriousness of
a juvenile's offense." Id at 933-34 n.2.
132. It is a basic principle of criminal law that no person should be pun-
ished for crimes they could not prevent themselves from committing. E.g.,
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Daniel M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (H.L. 1843). Therefore, if a person can-
not be held legally responsible for the original act, it would be inherently un-
fair to enhance punishment of the later act because of the original excusable
act.
The Guidelines, however, make no specific provision for criminal history
points resulting from periods of incarceration for mental illness. The language
of the Guidelines also may open the formerly mentally ill to the possibility of
enhanced punishment based on their conduct while mentally ill. The Guide-
lines may include incarceration for mental illness under § 4A1.2(f) - diver-
sionary dispositions. Under § 4A1.2(f), no points are added for diversionary
dispositions that do not result in a "finding or admission of guilt." A finding
or admission of guilt in a judicial proceeding, however, is counted in the crimi-
nal history score "even if a conviction is not formally entered." U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(f) (emphasis added). This rule reflects the Sentencing Commission's
policy "that defendants who receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence
and continue to commit crimes should not be treated with further leniency."
Id § 4A1.2 application note 9.
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sufficient in juvenile proceedings are not sufficient in adult pro-
ceedings, 13 3 McKeiver cannot support the collateral use of such
juvenile proceedings against juveniles when they reach
adulthood.
When juveniles may face more than six months of addi-
tional confinement as adults, because of their deviant juvenile
behavior, they deserve the same protection that juries provide
to adults.1' The courts would not enhance adult punishment
with prior juvenile offenses if the juvenile in those prior of-
fenses had been denied her sixth amendment right to coun-
sel.:3 Similarly, if an adult had been denied the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial, the court could not use any
conviction resulting from that proceeding to enhance a later
punishment. 36
The situation arising under section 4A1.2(d), where courts
enhance adult sentences because of juvenile adjudications, can-
not be distinguished from Baldasar. In Baldasar, the Court
held that although a prior conviction may be valid for a limited
purpose, it cannot be used later to enhance a subsequent sen-
tence if the prior conviction would be unconstitutional for plac-
ing an adult in prison.137 To illustrate this notion, consider a
case, such as Williams set forth above, in which the original ju-
venile adjudication was valid for juvenile therapeutic purposes.
The later collateral use of the adjudication to enhance an adult
133. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971) (the right
to a jury trials is not required in juvenile proceedings regardless of the possi-
ble length of incarceration) with Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)
(the right to a jury trial is required for all proceedings "where imprisonment
for more than six months is authorized").
134. RL.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 32, 38 (Alaska 1971). Adults whose
sentences are enhanced under § 4A1.2(d) may be deprived of liberty solely as a
result of their juvenile records. The Guidelines-required enhancement may
force a judge to sentence a person to jail time, whereas if they had no criminal
history points, they would receive no jail time. See U.S.S.G. § 5A (for offense
levels two through six).
135. See Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987); Grant v.
White, 579 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1978); see also In re J.W., 164 Ml1. App. 3d 826,
830, 518 N.E.2d 310, 313 (1987) (uncounseled juvenile convictions may not be
used to adjudicate a juvenile as a habitual juvenile offender); People v. Miller,
179 Mich. App. 466, 469, 446 N.W.2d 294, 295 (1989) ("a court may not consider
factors violative of a defendant's constitutional rights in passing sentence").
136. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972). Enhancement
under Burgett and Baldasar would be improper if Williams had been an adult
at the time of his prior sentence, because adult sentences may not be enhanced
with prior constitutional proceedings that did not offer full due process. See
supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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sentence should be invalid, because the original proceeding
would have been unconstitutional for the purpose of placing an
adult in prison.
B. PROBLEMS wITH SECTION 4A1.2(d)'s ENHANCEMENT
MECHANISM
Even if juveniles receive the right to a jury trial in juvenile
proceedings,138  problems still exist with using juvenile
sentences as the enhancement mechanism, as required by sec-
tion 4A1.2(d). These problems concern using treatment ori-
ented sentences to enhance punitive sentences. When
sentencing courts treat a sentence imposed because of a juve-
nile adjudication as if it were imposed by an adult court, courts
perpetuate unfair and arbitrary sentence enhancement. Such
enhancement contradicts Congress's intent in establishing the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate the Guidelines.139 To
remedy these problems, courts must limit the use of juvenile
sentences to enhance adult sentences. Properly limited, such
use would occur only if strict constitutional standards were fol-
lowed in earlier juvenile proceedings whose nature was
punitive.
1. Fairness Problems
Today, twenty-four years after Gault, most juvenile pro-
ceedings still fail to meet its "fundamental fairness" stan-
dard.14 The government prosecutes juveniles on charges that
would not withstand the higher evidentiary and probable cause
standards in the adult context.141 The frequency with which
some juveniles come before judges causes prejudice towards the
juvenile defendants, thus compounding the inequitable treat-
ment of juvenile offenders.142 For example, a juvenile judge af-
138. At least in terms of the sixth amendment protections, providing
juveniles with jury trials would insure the constitutionality of § 4A1.2(d). The
constitutionality of enhancement based on juvenile dispositions derived under
the juvenile search standard of New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), may
still raise fourth amendment questions.
139. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
140. See Feld, In Re Gault Revisited A Cross-State Comparison of the
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 1988 CRIME & DELINQ. 393-94.
141. Juveniles may be stopped and searched on the suspicion of having
committed status offenses. See, e.g., TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341-46.
142. Feld, supra note 45, at 231, 239-41. Professor Feld notes:
Whenever a judge knows information that is not admissible at trial
but is prejudicial to a defendant, the impartiality of the tribunal is
open to question.... To whatever degree a judge is unable to coin-
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ter previously seeing a child for three or four uncounseled
status and misdemeanor offenses, is more likely to treat the
child harshly for a felony offense the next time he sees that
child.143
The constitutional validity of juvenile adjudications that
lack the rigorous safeguards of adult criminal courts rests on
the juvenile justice system's adherence to rehabilitative rather
than penal goals.144 When courts use juvenile adjudications to
enhance adult sentences, the adjudications in effect become
"crimina]ized." This event, in turn, should cause the constitu-
tional validity of the juvenile adjudications to disappear.145
Therefore, when the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile justice
system is later abandoned in favor of the punitive policies of
the Guidelines, the constitutional validity for the juvenile jus-
tice system as a whole comes into question.
Because of enhancement based on section 4A1.2(d) of the
Guidelines, prior juvenile proceedings are no longer the benign
and beneficial therapeutic events that the McKeiver Court envi-
sioned.14 6 Even if juveniles receive the right to a jury trial, the
Sentencing Commission has failed to articulate any independ-
ent reason why the earlier good-for-the-child-treatment-ori-
ented juvenile proceedings should now lead to adult prison
walls. Nor have courts addressed the conflict created when the
punitive policies of the Guidelines supplant the therapeutic as-
partmentalize, a juvenile is denied the basic right to a fair trial by an
impartial tribunal with a determination of guilt based on admissible
evidence.... Since juveniles have no right to a jury trial, their risk of
prejudice are aggravated by their inability to avoid those risks.
Id.
143. See Feld, supra note 63, at 1245 (the severity of punishments increases
as the number of prior offenses increase).
144. Inmates of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364(D.R.I. 1972); see also Zimring, supra note 102, at 197.
145. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., con-
curring) (juvenile adjudications do not require jury trials when they are not
"criminal proceedings"). When involuntary commitments are criminal, they
trigger the range of criminal procedural protections. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364, 372 (1986).
146. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. At the time the Court
decided McKeiver, state sentencing of juveniles was quite different from today.
See Feld, supra note 48, at 889-90. Many states have moved to a punitive sen-
tencing model. Nearly one-third of the states now either use minimum
mandatory sentences for serious offenses, determinative sentencing statutes,
or administrative sentencing guidelines for incarcerating juveniles. Id These
sentences are not based on the "needs" of the juvenile offenders, but upon the
past crimes they have committed. I
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sumptions held by the judges and attorneys at the initial juve-
nile adjudication.
Although a court may appropriately apply a lower proce-
dural standard when punishment is neither the aim nor the re-
sult of the process,147 such a lower standard is inappropriate
when actual punishment is the goal.148 Although juvenile
judges may determine that a period of therapeutic incarceration
will rehabilitate a juvenile,149 under section 4A1.2(d), this ther-
apeutic incarceration for the child's good, works to the adult's
detriment. i ° In addition, when sentencing minor juvenile of-
fenders, juvenile judges may be more likely than adult criminal
judges to issue sentences of greater severity,151 because thera-
peutic decisions by definition have no detrimental effect. 52
Conversely, if juvenile judges know that a juvenile sentence
will become a permanent black mark on the juvenile's record
used to enhance an adult sentence, judges may be more likely
to ensure that the sentence corresponds to the seriousness of
the underlying offense1ss
The Sentencing Commission erred in assuming that, re-
147. See generally McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528-53 (jury trials not constitution-
ally mandated when punishment is not the aim of the proceeding).
148. The Supreme Court applies the fourteenth amendment "fundamental
fairness" standard to measure the extent of juvenile constitutional rights
under state law. I& at 543. The "fundamental fairness" standard is a judicial
balancing test applied specifically to the states. The courts balance the state's
parens patriae interest with fourteenth amendment due process considera-
tions. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
149. Feld, supra note 45, at 246.
150. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
151. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The juvenile judge's
goal in sentencing is to reform the child's behavior, to rehabilitate the of-
fender. A severe sentence for a minor crime may persuade the child to leave
"his path down the road of crime." See Feld, supra note 6, at 695. The adult
criminal judge, however, simply punishes the offender for the offense he com-
mitted. For example, although shoplifting an item valued at under $50 is a
petty misdemeanor in most states, subject to only a fine, a juvenile found to
have committed the same offense may be incarcerated. Cf Mcfeiver, 403 U.S.
at 552 (White, J., concurring) (juvenile custody is not "any measure of the seri-
ousness of the particular act that the juvenile has performed").
152. Cf. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552 (White, J., concurring) (a juvenile dispo-
sition will last no longer than required to prove that the juvenile's behavior is
acceptable); Fink, supra note 61, at 276 (juvenile courts must consider not only
the present interests of the child and society, but also the courts "must at-
tempt to envision within the significant limits of the state of the art of predic-
tion the interests and circumstances, as well as the probable effects of
particular modes of intervention, upon the future child") (emphasis in
original).
153. Two of the factors that juvenile judges consider in making their dispo-
sitional decisions are "whether the child will commit a future crime or
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gardless of the procedural safeguards employed, the substantive
results would and should be the same in juvenile cases as in
adult criminal cases. Because the procedural safeguards em-
ployed in therapeutic proceedings are less rigorous than those
employed in criminal procedures,'L4 a sentence of incarceration
is more likely to result from juvenile procedures.1ss Therefore,
juvenile adjudications which result in incarceration should be
more constitutionally suspect when used for enhancement
purposes.'1 6
Nowhere do the Guidelines address constitutional problems
of notice. 57 Such problems arise when the juvenile is not in-
formed that courts may use sentences imposed as a juvenile for
enhancement purposes in the adult system.'-S If the juvenile
judge were to provide the juvenile with notice of future detri-
mental effect, counsel for the juvenile could urge an alternative
disposition that may reduce or eliminate the juvenile's criminal
history score. Under Supreme Court precedent, this possibility
renders the juvenile sentence imposed without notice invalid
for enhancement purposes. 59
whether a particular treatment modality will help or hinder his progress."
Fink, supra note 61, at 276.
154. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986) (Illinois commit-
ment proceedings under its Sexual Dangerous Person's Act are not criminal in
nature and therefore do not trigger the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
155. Higher standards of punitive procedures lead to different substantive
outcomes in criminal cases. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S 431, 444 n.5 (1984)
(increasing the prosecution's burden of production makes conviction of the de-
fendant more difficult). As the procedural requirements increase, the prosecu-
tion's burdens of persuasion and production increase proportionately.
156. Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 n.2 (1980) (per curiam) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (misdemeanor convictions may be "less reliable than fel-
ony convictions").
157. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (specifying constitutional notice re-
quirements). The court in United States v. Daniels, 929 F.2d 128 (4th Cir.
1991), did discuss problems of notice to juvenile offenders in relationship to
§ 4A1.2(d), but did "not reach the point" in its conclusion. Id at 130.
Juveniles also continue to have problems receiving counsel. See generally
Feld, supra note 63, at 1199-1209 (noting that in many places, despite Gault,
juveniles do not receive counsel). In addition, a majority of juveniles in many
jurisdictions "waive" their right to counsel. Id at 1201.
158. This also raises the question of whether a minor can legally consent to
something tl?.at will be detrimental to himself as an adult. In contrast, it
should be noted that in many states, a minor cannot even enter into a contract.
See, e.g., Winter v. Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d 786, 795 (Minn. 1987) (Coyne, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) ("A typical instance of a voidable contract is
a contract of a minor child. The child is not bound and may disavow the
contract.").
159. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972) (reasoning that the
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Further, the Guidelines do not address problems arising
from prior unconstitutional juvenile adjudications that often
taint subsequent juvenile dispositions.1 60 Because a juvenile
judge can consider a juvenile's prior uncounseled convictions
during disposition, the problems with the collateral use of juve-
nile sentences are compounded.' 6 ' The nature of the juvenile
justice system makes it possible that the system will not dis-
cover an unconstitutional adjudication until late in the juve-
nile's life, if at all. 62 Therefore, even if the juvenile receives
full due process rights for the specific juvenile offense used for
enhancement, the danger of inadvertently compounding an ear-
lier error is grave. For example, judges in juvenile court con-
sider prior status offenses and petty misdemeanors, offenses
that courts sentencing adults under the Guidelines do not con-
sider. 63 Although the Guidelines disregard the petty offenses,
these prior adjudications directly affect juvenile sentencing.' 64
When prior uncounseled adjudications lead the juvenile
court judge to sentence the juvenile as a delinquent, 6 5 the sen-
tence becomes suspect. Further, enhancement of an adult sen-
tence predicated on prior juvenile enhancement, and further
predicated on prior unconstitutional juvenile adjudications,
poses an unresolved problem. The use of these later periods of
incarceration are constitutionally infirm in adult contexts
under Balcksar.36 These sentences, however, are not easily
question is not whether the results of the original proceedings would have
been different, but whether the sentencing judge would have imposed a differ-
ent sentence without previous unconstitutional convictions).
160. See Feld, supra note 6, at 722.
161. See id. (the use of prior unconstitutional convictions to sentence com-
pounds the original injustice).
162. The failure of juveniles to receive counsel in juvenile proceedings may
result in earlier unconstitutional prosecutions not being brought to the atten-
tion of the juvenile courts at the time of disposition. See Feld, supra note 63,
at 1199 (juveniles are often unable to prepare adequately for their own defense
because of their youth).
163. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
165. A juvenile adjudication evidentiary standard less stringent than the
adult standard might also allow a judge to make a finding of delinquency. See,
e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-46 (1985).
166. Applying the holding of Baldasar, the Guidelines provide that an un-
counseled misdemeanor convictions that result in unconstiutional sentences of
imprisonment are not to be included in the calculation of a criminal history
score. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 6. Because a sentence in violation of
Baldasar in the adult context is unconstitutional, a similar sentence in the ju-
venile context should also be unconstitutional.
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discovered as infirm.167 Even if the final disposition of a juve-
nile adjudication would remain unchanged despite enhanced ju-
venile rights, the Constitution demands that the denial of the
opportunity to fully exercise those rights should void the use of
those sentences. 168
2. Congressional Intent Problems
In establishing the Sentencing Commission to create the
Guidelines, Congress wanted to eliminate the consideration of
discretionary factors, 169 such as race, sex, or socioeconomic sta-
tus, in sentencing. 70 By incorporating juvenile offenses into
criminal history scores under section 4A1.2(d) of the Guide-
lines, the Sentencing Commission unintentionally incorporates
into the new sentencing system some of the very biases' 7 1 that
Congress wanted to eliminate. Therefore, by considering prior
juvenile adjudications, courts applying section 4A1.2(d) con-
tinue to inadvertently consider these discretionary factors.172
A typical case of this type of biased discretionary sentenc-
ing might occur when two juveniles are caught breaking and
entering together. A judge may direct one juvenile into a com-
munity service program because the juvenile comes from a
"good home" and is a motivated student. The same judge, how-
ever, might sentence the other juvenile to a period at the deten-
tion center because the juvenile comes from an unstable home
environment located in a decaying inner-city neighborhood.173
If the two individuals later commit an offense together as
167. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
168. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972) (reasoning that
the question is not whether the results of the original proceedings would have
been different, but whether the sentencing judge would have imposed a differ-
ent sentence without previous unconstitutional convictions).
169. The Guidelines do allow for an increase or decrease in a defendant's
criminal history score where "reliable information indicates that the criminal
history [score] does not adequately reflect" the defendant's criminal history or
likelihood of recidivism. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. However, "a prior arrest record it-
self" may not be considered under this provision. Id Any departure from the
Guidelines is grounds for appeal. IM. § IA2.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988).
171. See pup, notes 12-17; 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988).
172. Under the Guidelines, the prior state sentences of adults based on the
use of "illegal" discretionary factors at the state level also affect criminal his-
tory scores. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 6 (all sentences that are not
constitutionally invalid are counted in the criminal history scores).
173. The Cault Court pointed out that the Constitution cannot permit juve-
nile judges or welfare workers to violate the due process rights of children in
"their zeal to care for [them]." 387 U.S. at 19 n.25.
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adults, only the individual sentenced to detention as a juvenile
would receive enhanced punishment as an adult according to
section 4A1.2(d).174 Such disparate treatment occurs because,
despite having committed the same two offenses, only the sec-
ond individual was "sentenced" within the meaning of section
4A1.2(d) as a juvenile. 175 Thus, the Guidelines, founded on uni-
formity, fail when later objective determinations depend on
earlier subjective determinations.
The Guidelines also fail to correct other differences. 176
Most importantly, section 4A1.2(d) does not distinguish be-
tween juvenile misdemeanor and felony offenses in determin-
ing criminal history scores.177 The Guidelines differentiate only
according to the length of time served. By failing to recognize
the differences in the seriousness of the prior offenses, section
4A1.2(d) ignores Congress's underlying mandate for uniformity.
As a result, when sentenced as adults for the same offenses, se-
rious violent juvenile offenders actually may receive lighter
sentences than the repetitive troublemaking, but non-violent,
juvenile misdemeanant. 178 This unequal treatment cannot be
174. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
175. "Government is at its most arbitrary when it treats similarly situated
people differently." Etelson v. Office of Personnel Management, 684 F.2d 918,
926 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
176. The Guidelines do try to correct for differential treatment of adult de-
fenders based on the age classification of "juvenile offense" by various states.
Attempting to count every juvenile adjudication would have the po-
tential for creating large disparities due to the differential availability
of records. Therefore, for offenses committed prior to age eighteen,
only those that resulted in adult sentences of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month, or resulted in imposition of an adult or ju-
venile sentence or release from confinement on that sentence within
five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense are
counted. To avoid disparities from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the
age at which a defendant is considered a 'juvenile," this provision ap-
plies to all offenses committed prior to age eighteen.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 7 (emphasis added).
177. As Justice Marshall recognized in Baldasar, "misdemeanor convictions
may actually be less reliable than felony convictions." Baldasar, 446 U.S. at
228 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Guidelines do exempt juvenile status
offenses, truancy, hitchhiking, loitering, vagrancy, public intoxication, and mi-
nor traffic infractions from calculation in criminal history scores. U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(c)(2). A juvenile, however, may find that a status offense can easily
become a more serious crime. For example, a juvenile adjudicated a habitual
truant may find himself in contempt of court if he does not obey a judge's or-
der to return to school.
178. A juvenile found to have committed murder or rape by a juvenile
court and sentenced to juvenile incarceration until the age of majority will re-
ceive a maximum of two points in his criminal history score for the crime - a
Category II offender. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4AI.2(d)(2)(A), 5A. The petty juvenile
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reconciled with the dominant policy of the Guidelines of en-
hancing the punishment of adults demonstrating career crimi-
nal behavior patterns.
The method used to determine the length of confinement
imposed most dearly reflects the problem with enhancement
based only on the length of prior sentences. 179 In the Williams
case, for example, Williams was committed to the California
Youth Authority following his second juvenile bank robbery. 80
Williams's commitment, however, was not for a fixed sen-
tence.' 8 ' Instead, the Youth Authority determined the duration
of Williams's incarceration according to its treatment mandate.
A judge sentencing Williams, in contrast, might have taken into
consideration the affect of the length of the sentence on Wil-
liams's adult criminal history score. Moreover, because the
length of juvenile incarceration directly affects the period of
adult incarceration under section 4A1.2(d), the Guidelines un-
fairly penalize an adult who, as a juvenile committed only mi-
nor offenses, but was incarcerated by a judge as a warning.
Finally, section 4A1.2(d) fails to distinguish adequately be-
tween adult and juvenile sentences. Consequently, defendants
receive the same increase in their criminal history score for all
offenses that result in a sentence of less than one year, regard-
less of whether the sentence was imposed in an adult criminal
court or a juvenile court.'8 2 For example, as applied in the
Williams case, section 4A1.2(d) effectively equated Williams
prior juvenile disposition with an adult criminal conviction. 83
shoplifter caught and convicted of shoplifting on seven different occasions and
never incarcerated will receive seven criminal history points - a Category IV
offender. See id-
179. A juvenile disposition resulting in a period of incarceration of less
than 60 days results in a lower criminal history score than an incarceration of
60 or more days. I& § 4A1.2(d). The length of the incarceration will often de-
pend in part on prior juvenile offenses, whether or not they resulted in
incarceration.
180. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1989), cert de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990).
181. The Youthful Offender Parole Board determines the length of incar-
ceration of a juvenile committed to the California Youth Authority. See Feld,
supra note 48, at 878.
182. Under the Guidelines, Williams's first bank robbery sentence would
have added two points to his criminal history score whether he had been sen-
tenced for 180 days to prison as an adult with full constitutional protection or
whether, as was the case, he was sentenced to 180 days in the county juvenile
hall. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 with i& § 4A1.2(d).
183. One of the crucial variables in determining if something is a criminal
prosecution is whether it can lead to a deprivation of liberty for the purpose of
punishment. The McKeiver Court premised its ruling in part on the fact that
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Thus, Williams's 180 days in juvenile hall added two points to
his criminal history score, the same number of points he would
have received for the sentence had he been an adult afforded
full due process protection.'84
C. MITIGATING THE PROBLEMS
Providing juveniles with the right to a jury trial would mit-
igate the unfairness inherent in section 4A1.2(d). As section
4A1.2(d) is now applied, denying juveniles a jury trial could
snowball beyond the treatment of juvenile delinquency to
longer sentences for the person when they commit crimes as
adults. By providing juveniles the right to a jury trial, the sys-
tem would insure than any juvenile sentence, used to enhance
an adult sentence, was imposed only after the juvenile adjudica-
tion satisfied the minimum due process standards guaranteed
by the Constitution.'a 5 At a minimum, providing juveniles with
jury trials would increase the aggregate validity of resulting
adjudications.
Juries provide all defendants with essential protections
from the long and protective arm of the government. l 6 In the
juvenile context, juries are more likely to protect the rights of
juveniles than are judges'8 7 because juries are held to the stan-
dard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,1ss and are more likely
to acquit a juvenile than a judge.'8 9 In addition, the procedural
formalities of the right to a jury trial would reinforce the often
ignored juvenile right to counsel.1
"the juvenile court proceeding had not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecu-
tion,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment." McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971). Because the Guidelines use juvenile ad-
judications to deprive adults of their liberty in adult criminal facilities for pun-
ishment reasons, it is hard to distinguish those juvenile adjudications from
McKeiver's idea of a criminal prosecution.
184. U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(b), 2(d)(2)(A).
185. Although in adult proceedings other rights may be more important
than the right to a jury trial, the realities of the juvenile justice system make
for the exact opposite. Contrary to common assumption, empirical research
studies have shown that unrepresented juvenile offenders are more likely to
avoid incarceration or receive shorter sentences than juveniles with counsel.
Feld, supra note 140, at 396. The Guidelines fail to recognize this reality.
186. See Feld, supra note 6, at 719.
187. Id
188. See Feld, supra note 45, at 246. Juries are usually more favorable to
the accused than a judge is. Id
189. Id,
190. Because of the time and expense involved in jury trials, the court and
the prosecution would find it undesirable for a juvenile to exercise his right to
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Finally, juries enhance other constitutional rights by rais-
ing the level of public scrutiny and awareness of the juvenile
justice system.191 Such scrutiny and awareness can prevent the
juvenile court from again becoming a 'kangaroo court" where
the juvenile is presumed guilty of something and the court's
only job is to discover what.
CONCLUSION
The United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(d)
has opened the floodgates for the enhancement of adult
sentences based on prior juvenile adjudications in a manner
that the McKeiver Court never contemplated. Thus, under sec-
tion 4A1.2(d), juvenile offenders continue to receive the "worst
of both worlds:"'192 they do not receive the sixth amendment
protections adults receive, but they may endure additional
adult punishment. The collateral use of juvenile adjudications
to enhance adult sentences demonstrates that the Supreme
Court's "fundamental fairness" standard has failed to protect
the very persons it was meant to protect. The Supreme Court,
by refusing to review the constitutionality of section
4A1.2(d), 193 has only postponed the need to clarify the mini-
mum constitutional standards governing the enhancement of
adult sentences on the basis of juvenile adjudications.
David Dormont
a jury trial without counsel and are therefore more likely to see that the juve-
nile receives counsel.
191. Juvenile proceedings may be closed to the public. McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
192. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566 (1966).
193. Williams v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1496 (1990) (denying certiorari);
Mackbee v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2574 (1990) (same).
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